House of Commons
Canada

The Heritage Front Affair: Our View

First Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs

Shaughnessy Cohen, M.P.

Chair

June 1996

The Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affair has the honour to present its FIRST REPORT (slightly abbreviated)

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), your Committee has considered the First Report of the Sub-committee on National Security on "The Heritage Front Affair".

Your Committee adopted the following Report with recommendations which read as follows: "THE HERITAGE FRONT AFFAIR": OUR VIEW INTRODUCTION In August and September 1994. there were a number of public reports of allegations about the activities of an alleged CSIS source within the Heritage Front. It was reported that this Source had helped set up and finance the organization with the use of public funds and the support of a government agency. Among other activities, this person was alleged to have:

• spied on the CBC;
• used the Heritage Front to infiltrate the Reform Party of Canada;
• attempted to obtain personal information about members of the Jewish community
• engaged in illegal activities with "white supremacists";
• improperly obtained police information; and
• spied on a postal workers' union

When the first allegations became public, both SIRC and the Subcommittee began their respective reviews. While SIRC was conducting its investigation, the Subcommittee deferred its review so as to avoid duplication of effort. In the meantime, we carried out our consideration of documents and personnel security matters arising from the unauthorized release by an employee of classified material from the office of a former Solicitor General. That Report has already been tabled in the House of Commons. SIRC reported to the Solicitor General on December 9, 1994 and its Report was made public a week later.

The Subcommittee based its work on a detailed, critical consideration of the SIRC Report. In the CSIS Act, the Parliament of Canada set in place a control plan for CSIS which gives the responsibility for review of the Service to SIRC. We have reviewed SIRC's Report, examined its conclusions and questioned the foundations of its conclusions. Based upon this process and our further inquiries, we have set out our views of this Report.

The events dealt with in this Report represent an important test of the security intelligence scheme put in place by Parliament under the CSIS Act. In the so-called "Heritage Front Affair," one of the most intrusive investigation techniques possible was employed; the placement by a security intelligence agency of a human source within a group.

This Source was placed into the leadership core of a group known as the "Heritage Front". The placement of the Source occurred at a time of vigorous activity and confrontation among white supremacist factions and anti-racist groups, and among groups and individuals holding radically different points of view.

Canadians and this Subcommittee asked: was this appropriate? Was it properly monitored and reviewed? Was this Source accountable to an authority in whom Canadians are confident?

THE PROCESS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S REVIEW

On September 13. 1994, SIRC, which had already begun its review of the events, appeared before us in a public meeting. At that time we asked SIRC to answer certain questions, inquired as to the investigative methodology it proposed to follow and urged it to prepare its Report in such a way as to ensure that it could be made fully public.

On December 15, 1994, the SIRC Report was made public. The following day, we heard SIRC members in public session. Subsequently, during five in camera meetings with SIRC and SIRC staff, we examined its Report in detail, questioning them closely on their findings.

Subsequently, the Subcommittee heard from a former member of the Heritage Front and from a representative of the Canadian Centre on Racism and Prejudice.

In June of 1995, we heard from SIRC members and staff in a final, public session. The Director of CSIS appeared before us in camera at the end of May. 1996.

The name of an individual, Grant Bristow, figured prominently in the press in relation to this matter. It was alleged that he was the paid source who on behalf of CSIS infiltrated the Heritage Front and its predecessor circle of persons. Throughout its Report, SIRC does not confirm or deny the relationship between this individual and CSIS. Indeed, it frequently refers to Bristow and the Source in the same sentence as separate individuals.

The CSIS Act at section 18 prohibits the public identification of CSIS operatives. SIRC elected to comply with this provision in its Report in order that the Report could be published without any breach of the Act.

This Subcommittee is not unanimous in how to approach the issue of identification of the Source. The majority of the Subcommittee is of the view that the conventions in this field should be followed and that we should respect SIRC's concerns. Other Subcommittee members wish to answer directly the question of whether the Source and Mr. Bristow are the same person.

THE HERITAGE FRONT

Racist activity in Canada is not new. There have been several waves of it in the past. It has its modern roots in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Ku Klux Klan and different fascist groups were active in various parts of Canada. The second wave occurred between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, when US-inspired neo-nazi and anti-semitic activity surfaced. The third wave began in the early 1980s, and is with us still in various forms of "white supremacy". The Heritage Front has been at the centre of this wave.

Wolfgang Droege is the main force behind the Heritage Front. In May 1983, he was released from a US prison after serving a portion of a 3 year prison sentence under the US Neutrality Act for his part in attempting to organize an invasion of Dominica. In 1985, he was convicted in the US of weapons and drug trafficking offences for which he was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment. A long-time activist in right-wing extremist organizations, he in 1989 had the idea to establish an organization which would act as a kind of umbrella group. After attending, with the Source, Grant Bristow and others, a conference in Libya organized by the government of that country, he and a small group, including Bristow, formed the Heritage Front in September 1989.

The Toronto-based Heritage Front draws its membership from racists, neo-nazis, skinheads, and "white supremacists". There is no reliable way of knowing the size of its membership. It has no offices or meeting rooms of its own, or any formal organizational structure. Its membership fluctuates, with participants in its activities moving from one organization to another. Many of its activities are ad hoc in nature. Its main activities in the past have been to: set up telephone racist message lines; publish a periodical called Up Front; organize meetings at which racists and Holocaust denial lecturers speak; and organize skinhead dances where violent confrontations have at times occurred. It has also had branches in other parts of Ontario and contacts in Quebec, as well as relations with similar groups in other parts of Canada, the US, and elsewhere.

AN APPROPRIATE TARGET

When considering the public allegations dealt with in this Report, the Subcommittee posed several questions to itself. Was it appropriate for CSIS to refocus an existing investigation of the "extreme right wing" so as to target its leadership? That is, was the Heritage Front, once formed, through its leadership a possible threat to the security of Canada under section 2 of the CSIS Act and hence a legitimate target of investigation under section 12? Once the Heritage Front was formed, was it appropriate for CSIS to continue targeting its leadership through the placement beyond an initial period of a human source?

Under section 2 of the CSIS Act, "threats to the security of Canada" include espionage, sabotage, foreign-influenced activities, politically motivated violence, and subversion. Section 12 of the Act sets out the Service's security intelligence mandate. It allows CSIS to collect, analyze, and retain, to the extent that is strictly necessary, information and intelligence about activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of being threats to the security of Canada.

At the beginning of 1990, CSIS targeted the Source against Droege because of his increasing leadership role in extreme, right-wing, racist activity. CSIS believed that Droege trusted the Source and wanted him to be a part of the core group setting up the Heritage Front. CSIS was concerned that, if Droege were to become a leading personality, his organization would be harder to penetrate because of his past experience and security consciousness. SIRC noted that, "if this scenario were to materialize, (CSIS ) would be fortunate to have a source in on the ground floor". (SIRC Report, Chapter III, p.15 para 3.3.6)

According to SIRC, the leadership of the "extreme right" was at first targeted in 1990-91 under both paragraphs (b)(foreign-influenced activities) and (c)(politically motivated violence) of the section 2 CSIS Act definition of threats to the security of Canada. This was later (after 1991-92) changed to a paragraph (c) targeted threat only.

In the 1990-91 submission by TARC, it was concluded that after investigating the extreme right wing movement since 1985, CSIS had found petty criminal activity, but nothing that could be construed as threats to the security of Canada. CSIS then continued its TARC-approved investigation by refocusing its efforts on the leadership of the extreme right wing. (SIRC Report, Chapter II, para.2)

In the Subcommittee's view, the leadership of the extreme right and its most prominent emerging organization, the Heritage Front, were appropriately targeted. As stated earlier, the observation was made in 1990 by CSIS that the extreme right wing movement was not a threat to the security in Canada; however, the 1992-3 submission to TARC requested the continuation of the targeting authority because, among other charges, there was increased co-ordination among racist groups in Canada and elsewhere, and the groups made greater use of modern technology to monitor those who threatened their ideology. It also asserted that these groups had become more proactive in furthering their political objectives. Similar comments were made in the 1993 submission to TARC.

PLACEMENT OF A SOURCE

Effective investigations may be carried out through the use of a number of techniques. Some are more intrusive and more effective than others. Among these different techniques are: "environmental scanning"; monitoring of open sources; physical surveillance; electronic surveillance; recruitment of informants; and placement of human sources. The recruitment and placement of human sources is one of the most intrusive techniques available, as well as one of the most effective in terms of potential results. The placement of human sources brings with it a degree of uncertainty. The control and reliability of sources is fraught with difficulty. Their impact on individuals and groups is often unknown. Ensuring that they play a passive, intelligence-gathering role, rather than an active, provocative, counteracting role, is a true challenge.

An agency considering the placement of a source must take into account the type of person who might be available to act as a source. In order to be effective, the source must have the confidence of those in the targeted group which may mean that the source comes from an unsavory element or that he adopts some of the characteristics of the targeted group. Sources are not always members of the Canadian mainstream and they are not always law abiding citizens.

Because of these challenges, the Solicitor General of the day in October, 1989, issued a Ministerial Direction dealing with human sources, under section 6 of the CSIS Act, to the Director of CSIS (it was modified in August, 1993 by the Minister then in office and again in August 1995 by the present Solicitor General). It set out comprehensive instructions on the recruitment, authorization, use, behavior, remuneration, treatment and control of confidential human sources. At the time of the events dealt with in this Report, it enunciated six general principles on the use and management of confidential sources by CSIS. They are the following:

1. Human sources are to be used only when and to the extent reasonable and necessary.

2. The need for a human source must be measured against its impact on rights and freedoms.

3. The use of human sources is to be centrally directed and controlled within because of the intrusive nature of this technique.

4. Human sources are not to engage in illegal activities or to do things that will bring discredit on the Service or the Government of Canada.

5. Human sources are to be managed in such a way as to protect both the security of CSIS operations and the personal safety of the source.

6. Human sources are to be treated by the Service ethically and fairly in terms of handling and compensation.

The Ministerial Direction also dealt specifically with what is called the "most sensitive institution of our society". It instructed the Director of CSIS or a designate to personally approve the use of a human source in relation to any academic, political, religious, media or trade union institution. They were to be used in relation to such institutions with caution and with the greatest respect for rights and freedoms.

CSIS has also established a Target Approval and Review Committee, chaired by the Director of CSIS, to approve and manage human sources, as well as other approved techniques against designated targets. There is also provision both at Headquarters and in Regional Offices for the recruitment, control and remuneration of human sources. Finally, the CSIS Operational Manual provides detailed guidance to CSIS employees on many of these matters.

THE PLACEMENT OF THIS SOURCE

The placement of a source inside an organization such as the Heritage Front cannot help but have an effect on it and what it does. In this instance, CSIS directed a source to the leadership of the Heritage Front as it was being conceived and during the early days of its formation. The Service had already been investigating the activity of extremist right wing groups (section 2(c) threat) for a number of years before it authorized the placement of the Source near Wolfgang Droege in October 1989. The infiltration of a source was an effective means of obtaining information about a nascent right wing extremist organization being set up as an umbrella group by an individual with a long history of right wing extremist activity.

However, there came a time, as indicated earlier in this Report, when it was concluded in a 1990-91 submission to TARC that extreme right wing organizations and their related activities were viewed as petty criminal in nature and not to constitute a threat to the security of Canada. It is not clear to the Subcommittee why the Service did not simply refer these matters to law enforcement agencies, rather than redirecting the investigation and the Source for more than an initial period to the leadership of the extreme right wing. The key question is what was the justification for the continued targeting and the presence of the Source after 1990.

Recruiting and controlling sources is not easy. Because of the conflicting roles they play, as both trusted participant in the activities being monitored and provider of information about these activities, they are not always the most reliable people. There must not only be the confidence that the information provided will be accurate and useful, but that the human source will be trustworthy and discrete as to the dual role being played. This is especially important when a human source is being developed. Human source operations can fail because of unreliability, character weaknesses or detection by the target.

This Source was not unknown to the Service when he as initially "directed" to the extreme right wing movement and later to its leadership. He first came into contact with the Service in early 1986 in relation to a foreign country's intelligence activities in Canada. The foreign country cut off its connection with him when it learned he had been providing some assistance to the Service. In February, 1987, CSIS Headquarters was becoming a little concerned about the overzealousness of the Source. In June of that same year, a police source told CSIS that it had been advised by the Source that he was involved in a long-term Service operation. Consequently, contact by CSIS with the Source ceased.

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